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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

Science et philosophie. E. LE ROY. Rev. de Mét., VII, 4 and 5, pp. 375–425, 503–562.

The first stage of knowledge is very humble: it is that of everyday, practical knowledge. *Primum vivere, deinde philosophare.* The earliest work of the mind is to form things. What one ordinarily calls a fact is an adaptation of the real to practical interests and to the demands of social life. In order to overcome the original confusion, we separate, form groups, establish uniformities, fix permanencies, and thus create separate things, centres of convergence for action, places of repose for thought. As we act principally by contact, tactual and muscular impressions most commonly determine the limits of objects. An object of common experience, far from being a pure datum, is already an abstraction, a symbol of our power of acting. The human mind is like a prism which separates elements of sensation that are undecomposable for the non-reflective consciousness. The principal elements or aspects of sensation are intensity, tonality, purity, and extensity. Extensity expresses the amplitude of the acts which sensation proposes to us to execute, and defines the zone of indeterminateness for such reaction; hence it is a property of our reflective view of matter. The opinion is gaining ground among psychologists that extensity belongs, not merely to certain kinds of sensations, but to all. Much is to be said for this view; but we attend to extensity only in sensations coördinated with useful motions, with the result that visual or tactual extensity—more convenient, stable, and interesting—makes us neglect other extensities These, together with muscular extensity, fuse together to form what may be called 'imaginable' space. This last presents itself as a convenient and suggestive notation, through which we learn to perceive a 'logical function,' geometrical space, which we otherwise construct, and which corresponds to our unqualified power of differentiation. We necessarily think by means of common ideas, and are never able, in the *ensemble* of these latter, to examine thoroughly more than a few isolated points.

Everyday knowledge is the sole field for all possible speculation. The words 'reality,' 'truth,' 'certitude' are defined by the use which ordinary thought makes of them. It is, therefore, a mistake to raise problems with respect to them which would imply a higher or more subtle meaning of the words. In common knowledge the foundation, which consists in a grasp of reality, is indubitable and solid; but the form, wholly practical, is not to be trusted. This form, the result of a separation and a spatialization arranged for the convenience of external or internal discourse, expresses only the relation of things to our power of acting upon them, whether by the body for life or by the mind for thought.

Science, in spite of the chimerical hopes of those who would make of it the only knowledge worthy of reasonable man, has not for its object the inner life and infinite wealth of concrete reality. As we have seen, it always proceeds by symbolical representation. Its supreme object is the complete reduction of the world to terms of mind. Hence it is wholly relative to a particular point of view, that of discourse, determining what may be called the 'rationalistic' attitude of the mind. In this sense, one may speak of the contingency of scientific truths. Does this mean absolute skepticism? By no means. The only reason why it seems to do so is, that many, perhaps the majority, have a totally wrong conception of truth; for they hold to the scholastic view that truth consists in the conformity of thought to its object. The only possible criteria are those within science itself. There are several such: logical coherence or non-contradiction, the æsthetic joy of thought when contemplating the harmony of its works, etc. Scientific truth is thus, in the last analysis, only fidelity to the essential point of view which defines science itself. This truth is entirely relative to a certain intellectual attitude, to a certain orientation of thought, to a certain project of the mind—very legitimate, no doubt, but nowise unique or preëminent. In short, science receives from common sense the matter which it organizes; in itself it is only a form. Science begins with a 'positive' stage, in which it collects materials, etc. It then passes through an 'experimental' stage, and finally arrives at a third and last stage, the 'rational' stage. With only the resources of discursive reason, it endeavors to construct a model of the world. The rationalistic method, characteristic of completed science, may be applied to any subject-matter, but is able completely to penetrate none. It cannot go beyond symbolical representation. Hence its laws of origin and genesis cannot escape contingency and relativity.

E. A.

Déterminisme et contingence. Réponse a l'article de M. Brunschvicg. CHARLES DUNAN. Rev. de Mét., VII, 6, pp. 647–683.

In this article the writer answers objections to his theory and explains more fully such parts as have been misunderstood. After showing that the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz treat living beings as absolute, he says that the moment one conceives living beings as absolute there is implicitly admitted that there is contingency in the universe, both according to space and according to time. A discussion of the relation of phenomena and noumena follows, in which he divides noumena into two classes or degrees: (1) those of which we can have a partial knowledge, *e.g.*, God and the soul; (2) those of which we can have absolutely no knowledge, *e.g.*, the action of God on the soul, and the nature of the reason according to which His providence acts in the government of the universe. As evolution cannot account for quality, it gives us only a one-sided and hence partial interpretation of the universe. Contingency alone saves reason for us as the faculty of the universal and the absolute. The multiplicity of absolute beings which the doctrine of contingency admits, is in no wise incompatible with the possibility of a universal synthesis of phenomena. The Kantian doctrine of the relativity of knowledge is next considered. Kant's separation of phenomena and noumena is held responsible for the results which he reaches. "The reason for the order of phenomena as it appears to us in time or space, can only be found in noumena of the second degree." There exist noumenal reasons which control, not only the existence of events, but also the order in which they succeed each other or coexist in our representation, *i. e.*, in nature. The remainder of the article is given up to a discussion of instinct. On this point he differs greatly from M. Brunschvicg. Instinct has an advantage over reflection by the extent and the complexity of its works. It is infinite; it is reason in its highest, most perfect, infallible form, since it is reason out of time, and is free from all errors resulting therefrom. In so far as instinct is capable of development, reflection is its judge and is superior to it. In order to judge there must be a norm, and this is the idea of the absolute.

HARRY L. TAYLOR.

Psychological Philosophies. SHADWORTH H. HODGSON. Mind, No. 32, pp. 432–438.

Psychological philosophies are those which explain the nature and activities of the universe by means of the nature and activities of man. All such attempts bear written upon their face the mark of presumption and impractibility. These philosophies are classed under three heads: (1) the soul or mind theory; (2) the ego theory; (3) the mental function theory. The soul or mind theory is of prehistoric antiquity. Matter must possess a principle of animation which is not itself material. This theory is now chiefly current in theology and poetry. Though inadequate in philosophy, it is of priceless value in expressing and enforcing moral and religious truths. (2) Modern philosophy begins with Descartes's famous dictum, *Cogito ergo sum.* In place of the conception of a soul or mind, Descartes substituted the conception of an ego or self. But this did not explain the nature of the ego or self. However, it was evident that there was unity in feelings, thoughts, and actions, and the question now was: In what does this unity consist? (3) Thus was the way opened for the mental function theories. Conspicuous among them is the Hegelian theory: the function of thought evolves and explains the rest. Two assumptions were necessary for this: (1) that thought possessed energy or activity in its own right; (2) that it also possessed in its own right at least one conception, that of being. Unlike the other two theories, it proceeded from philosophy to psychology. In its new shape the mind is supposed not only to animate, but to evolve matter out of its own conceptual activity. Another instance of the mental function theory is that of Schopenhauer. The will is the mental function explanatory of the universe. The individual is merged in the universal will. The author concludes that the human subject is too small a part of the infinite and eternal whole to be taken as a sample of all conscious subjects. It is, therefore, hopeless to try to solve the problems of philosophy by means of psychological conceptions.

MARGARET E. SCHALLENBERGER.

La notion de la vérité. D. MERCIER. Rev. Néo-Scol., VI, 4, pp. 371–403.

The common notion of truth, says Mercier, is perhaps best embodied in the dictum of Saint Thomas Aquinas that "truth is the agreement of things and of our thoughts"—thought being here taken to mean an affirmative or negative judgment. This definition is incomplete, however, in that it fails to take into account purely ideal truths. Mercier in his own definition—or interpretation of Saint Thomas's definition, as he prefers to call it—introduces a third element. Truth, he says, always implies a relation between two terms, which are thus necessarily present together in the mind; but it does not suffice for the comprehension of the truth to have merely a thing-in-itself and a thought; between these must come an *objective concept* of the thing-in-itself. The ordinary spontaneous consciousness neglects this third element, merely because it does not perceive distinctly all the intermediate steps by which philosophical analysis proceeds. Logical truth is not the agreement of a thought with some external reality, but the agreement of a judgment with a relation between two abstract concepts. The traditional definition—that logical truth is the agreement of our thoughts with reality—may still be maintained, however, on the condition that we understand 'thought' to mean judgment and 'reality' to mean, in the first place, the objective identity of two terms of judgment, and, in the second place, the objective reality of each of the two terms.

G. BENEDICT.

A Note on the Religious Significance of Science. JOSEPH LE CONTE. Monist, X, 2, pp. 161–166.

Science has grown so rapidly that it has not been able to organize its vast store of material into rational knowledge, and bring it into harmonious relations with the highest law, that of our moral and æsthetic nature. Hence pseudo-scientists would break with the past and build everything anew. The advent of a true rational spirit, which comes with increased knowledge, will change all this. A thorough apprehension of the idea of evolution will lead the scientist to see that the past is necessary to an understanding of the future. "Science has come not to destroy but to fulfil and verify all that is best and truest in our faiths and aspirations, and thus to purify and ennoble art and religion."

HARRY L. TAYLOR.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Psychological Atomism. H. MÜNSTERBERG. Psych. Rev., VII, 1, pp. 1–17.

Ideas are compounded of sensations. But emotions and volitions are admittedly not so compounded. Still, the only language we have is the language of sensation, and we must be content to explain even emotions and volitions in its terms. Now, if we can find something more fundamental than sensation, it will serve as an explanation of all our mental phenomena. Is there any reason for considering sensation as the ultimate? No; for it has been found that the stimulus does not affect one brain-cell merely, but that, as it travels from the periphery to the center, it acquires a greater and greater complexity and floods a number of cells. But we can hardly consider that the sensation is the accompaniment of a number of precisely similar cellular affections. It is not a mere addition of like to like. Each cell has its peculiar nature and mental expression. Hence we may think of the sensation as made up of a plurality of dissimilar atoms—each atom having its physical basis in an individual cell. This cell seems to be the ultimate physiological unit; and the psychological atom the final unity in consciousness. But these atoms are absolutely dissimilar, and hence are not grouped as belonging peculiarly to this or that sense. Since we cannot have the same object twice in consciousness, these atoms can exist but once. They are capable of all degrees of vividness, and it is with their *uniform* increase or decrease of vividness that the sensation has more or less of this characteristic. If the vividness of some increase more than that of others, we have change in the quality or the intensity of the sensation. We are to discover these atoms by studying association, inhibition, and fusion.

R. V. NYE.

Die Wahrnehmung von Tonveränderung. L. WILLIAM STERN. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XI, 1, pp. 1–30; XXI, 1, pp. 360–388; XXII, 1, pp. 1–12.

Ein Beitrag zur differentiellen Psychologie des Urtheilens. L. WILLIAM STERN. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XXII, 1, pp. 13–22.

Dr. Stern has recently completed his studies in the perception of tonal variations which were begun several years ago. In his first communication (1895), after a criticism of the work of Scripture, Preyer, and Hoefler, the methods and results of his own early experiments are reported in detail, and from them he draws the following general conclusions : (1) the certainty of the judgment in the perception of tonal variation is a direct function of the time during which the variation continues at a given rate of change, but with equal tones a greater degree of certainty does not always coincide with a greater rate of change ; (2) equal compasses of change are perceived more certainly at slower rates ; (3) there is a definite time in which the tendency to make the judgment is the most marked ('optimal time'). The second communication deals with the relation of the perception of discrete tonal differences to the perception of a continuously altering stimulus, with especial attention, (*a*) to the magnitude of difference, (*b*) to the rate of variation, and (*c*) to the direction of variation. Only two subjects were tested, the 'judgment method' being used with both. The time intervals were two, four, six, and eight seconds, the differences in the tones ranging from one and one-fourth to one and one-half vibrations. The following are the results : (1) continuous tonal variations are better noted than the corresponding discrete tonal differences ; (2) the capacity for judgment increases with the increase of difference, but more with continuous than with discrete intervals ; (3) with continuous variations a rise in pitch is judged with more certainty than a fall in pitch ; (4) the capacity for the perception of equality in two successive tones is extraordinarily small ; (5) the perception of continuous constancy is essentially dependent upon the contrast in which it stands to the immediately preceding and subsequent variations ; (6) six seconds is the 'optimal time' for judgment. The third communication discusses variation at quite different rates. The tones were in the neighborhood of 240 vibrations, and seven different rates were used, given both in mixed and in unmixed series. The following results were reached : (1) the limen for change decreases with the rate of change ; (2) rise in pitch is noted more quickly than fall in pitch, but procedure without knowledge especially affects the judgments of rise, hence the law. Stimuli which, in procedure with knowledge, are especially easily and accurately cognized, are particularly susceptible to diminished certainty in procedure without knowledge.

In a supplementary communication—*Ein Beitrag zur differentiellen Psychologie des Urtheilens*—the author reports in some detail the individual characteristics which his two subjects—R. and K.—displayed in making the judgments upon the tonal variations. The experiments undoubtedly offered an excellent opportunity for such a supplementary study, and the fact that the two subjects represented opposite temperamental types gave the investigator the advantages of a direct contrast. K.'s judgments are 'objective,' R.'s 'subjective'; K. resigned himself passively to the impression, proceeded contemplatively, and adapted his organism as completely as possible to the variations of the external stimulus, delaying the reaction until he arrived at a judgment that was certain. R., on the contrary, did not await, but anticipated, permitting prejudice and impatience to influence him, and displaying a noticeable tendency to premature reaction; the moment of perception was estimated much less by the nature of the stimulus than by the rhythm of attention. All this is worked out in considerable detail, and the author draws the general conclusion that the investigator in psychophysics should view the results of every experiment in the light of similar studies upon the individual differences of his subjects.

W. C. BAGLEY.

Die optische Localisation der Medianebene. M. SACHS und R. WLASSAK. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XXII, 1, pp. 23–46.

This is the report of a rather elaborate series of experiments which were undertaken to determine the method by which an object is judged to be neither to the right nor to the left, but directly in front of the observer, or, in quantitative terms, the degree to which the median plane, as determined by the eye, coincides with the anatomical median plane. The experiments were conducted in a dark room, the subject being required to locate an illuminated line which was moved from place to place before him, and the various positions of which were easily referable to the predetermined anatomical median of his own body. The investigators utilized a number of ingenious devices to eliminate, one by one, the various factors which could serve as criteria for judgment. Their most important conclusion is embodied in the following proposition: The localization of the median plane is dependent only upon the relations of the retinal images, and not upon the muscular sensations, nor upon the perception of movement.

W. C. BAGLEY.

The Memory Image and its Qualitative Fidelity. I. M. BENTLEY. Am. J. Ps., XI, 1, pp. 1–49.

The writer of this study sets for himself a threefold task: (1) to examine critically the place assigned to the image in the literature on the subject; (2) to discuss the nature and function of the image and its genetic significance; (3) to isolate the image for experimental investigation. In the first chapter, the literature is examined with a view to ascertaining just what aspects of memory have been investigated. It is seen from this that attention has been directed, for the most part, to memory as the capacity for retention, and to the various factors conditioning retention. Reproduction and recognition, the two methods which practically cover all the experiments on memory, have been used uncritically and their real basis has often been misconceived. 'Reproduction' sometimes results from the combination of peripherally excited sensations with a recollected memory core, or simply with a word which may be quite different in point of content from the original experience. Simple recognition stands much nearer positive or negative identification than it does to pure memory. The second chapter deals with two questions: (1) the relation of the memory image to perception, and (2) the function of the image in the life of the organism. A progressive series of the simpler types of meaning indicates the place where the memory image appears, and the important part which it plays in contributing to meaning. From the biological point of view, the memory image is shown to be a comparatively late acquirement of the organism. Its primary function is to prepare the organism for future adjustments. Chapter III gives in detail the results of the author's investigation of visual imagery.

LENA M. ALDRICH.

Routine Process. GUSTAV SPILLER. Mind, No. 32, pp. 439–466.

The question is discussed in nineteen sections, of which the first sixteen are devoted to organic reactions in the province of physiological action, the problem of learning to write being taken as a typical illustration. The last three sections deal with the explanation of thought as organic and with general conclusions. (1) The history of a routine process. The various difficulties encountered by the child in learning to write are set forth at length, and it is pointed out that attention is directed now to this difficulty, now to that. (2) Memorizing the facts. Difficulties are settled by memory and not by reason as at first. (3) The process of simplification The many-sided interest in writing disappears, error lapses, and interest in what is being written overpowers interest in the writing. (4) Reduction of effort. Less effort being required, less is given. (5) Appropriate exercise. Exercise with effort results in muscular strength and in skill. (6) A comparison. Arguments are summed up. (7) The result of liberating attention-energy. While we are engaged in writing, we are usually engaged in other directions also. (8) Does an organic trend ever become automatic? We cannot be completely absorbed in anything while writing. Routine process is not a mechanical step-to-step process. (9) Organic trends and memory. It is difficult to correct a poorly formed letter by willing to do so, for thinking and writing proceed independently. (10) The place of exercise. Improvement in the time and quality of writing is not in proportion to exercise. (11) The place of judgment. Judgment is more important than time or exercise. (12) Why is it difficult to influence organic trends? The learner does not remember what he has learnt or how he has learnt it. (13) Early education. The first three or four years of a child's life are very important. The author gives his reasons at length. (14) Each organic trend is based on others of its kind; organized trends are only new to a certain extent. (15) Each organic trend forms a basis for others of its kind; a sign-painter, *e. g.*, profits from knowing how to write. (16) What is an organic trend? This is answered principally by stating what it is not. (17) All thought is organic. Mental efficiency depends upon properly developed trends. (18) The psychological method. An organic trend means a simplified trend. Careful observation furnishes the only clue to modes of mental activity. (19) The cause of organic trends. This is to be found in the struggle of varying interests for a place in the narrow field of attention.

MARGARET E. SCHALLENBERGER.

L'analyse et les analystes. FR. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXIV, 12, pp. 561–593.

All of our mental life consists of the two processes of assimilation and dissimilation. In some cases these processes are the product, in others the occasion, of each other and of consequent mental acts. The mind analyzes only in order to recompound, it synthesizes only what has been previously analysed. Some minds incline too much towards analysis and have a mass of material, but build up no structure ; others synthesize too quickly and the result is useless ; others both analyze and synthesize proportionately and attain to more or less harmony. Spontaneous analysis consists in breaking up psychical phenomena into their elements. It is a sort of indirect and delicate observation, and should not be confused with incoherence, for this does not presuppose any analysis. There are many minds which cannot be characterized as analytic or synthetic, because they are neither the one nor the other, or, more rarely, because they are both in equal degree. The author then describes the different forms of the analytic mind; and their effects in art, music, literature, science, psychology, and philosophy. He then discusses the defects of the analytic type. Too great deliberation tends to inaction, and too excessive attention to details overcomes the symmetry of the whole. Extreme analysis tends to weaken the mind, especially if it does not finally result in decided thought or action. This incapacity to synthesize may be due to verbal or psychical blindness. Analysis is only one link in the chain of mental action, synthesis is the other, and only when we have both do we have equilibration.

F. M. WINGER.

L'education du caractère. JULES PAYOT. Rev. Ph., XXIV, 12, pp. 594–614.

In seeking for a definition we must remember that science excludes the accidental, hence the science of character has yet to be born. In order to study the formation of character, a certain number of human beings must be studied from infancy ; but, since experiment under fixed and controlled conditions is scarcely possible, the investigation becomes merely a deduction controlled by observation. The old method was to combine certain proportions of intelligence, sensibility, and will, and to deduce from this mixture certain kinds or classes of character. When observation was added to this, all precision disappeared and the result was unscientific. Apperception, imagination, and reason are the results of a vigorous attention, *i. e.*, the effects of certain qualities of the will, calm and prolonged. With education the individual's characteristics become more unified and stable ; the whole effort of education consists in ensuring the predominance of certain tendencies over other adverse ones. Character supposes unity and stability, is not given by nature, but is a slow and acquired formation given by environment, imitation, and education in the broad sense of the word.

There are certain fundamental modes of activity which determine the intellectual and sensible future of the child, and it is very essential that the educator should know how these activities operate. He should discover what tendencies are pernicious or advantageous; he should examine the danger and aids which the special environment offers to each child. In the cradle the child represents only a bundle of natural activities given by heredity; these are to be moulded into the best possible unitary and stable character which environment and education can afford.

F. M. WINGER.

ETHICAL.

The Ethics of Opinion-Making. JOHN M. ROBERTSON. Int. J. E., X, 2, pp. 173-193.

The author offers a contribution to the question raised by Fowler in regard to the Ethics of intellectual life and work. Fowler maintains that, under the influence of the Church, the moderns are not so free to seek truth as were the ancients. But this needs modification. Others besides the Christian Church have set barriers to truth-seeking, viz., Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Moslems, as well as many others. In the case of the two last-named, and of Christianity, the chief reason is that they rest on sacred books which rank as conventionally inviolable. But the very fact of intolerance indicates a keener concern about truth than could be found elsewhere. In history, the necessity of freedom from bias has been urged by Plato, Aristotle, the Gospels, Paul, Bacon, Descartes, and others. Bacon pleaded for "minds washed free from opinions." Spinoza, on the other hand, urged that belief follows knowledge, though he later recognized the fact that desire and passion also sway men's choice. Kant was strangely inconsistent, sometimes urging his *à priori* conception of duty, and again urging acquiescence in convention. Mill and Clifford also urge open-mindedness, though the latter goes too far; for non-belief on all matters not fully investigated is impossible. He does not practise it himself. James, on the other hand, in *The Will to Believe*, pleads for a freedom to believe in the indemonstrable, especially in matters religious, though he admits that in matters scientific there is scarcely ever any excuse for believing without evidence. The author concludes by saying that the ideal is to develop some measure of the temper now held to be imperative in science, where, in the main, men escape the "tincture of passion."

A. W. CRAWFORD.

The Moral Law. FRANK THILLY. Int. J. E., X, 2, pp. 223-235.

We must examine the actions and motives commonly called 'good' and 'bad,' and try to discover their underlying principle. Then we can deduce an ethical system. First, we must determine the characteristic quality of the moral law. This forbids actions detrimental to others, and ordains those which would be helpful, and is thus seen to be sympathy. This, then, is an original human possession, and is that from which morality evolves. Negative commands will at first be most prominent, as most necessary to the conservation of society, although very soon positive commands will be made in order to the advancement of society. Self-realization is never the end, though egoistic impulses are not wrong until they cause injury to others. When consciousness develops, motives as well as actions are judged, and thus morality becomes internal. So there may be a discrepancy between conduct and motives. All moral imperatives seek a certain end, the welfare of others. This we cannot explain; it is the bed-rock of ethics. This end never changes, though the laws, as means to this end, necessarily change as knowledge grows and conditions differ. For ethical precepts are based on natural laws which are empirical judgments. The end being social welfare, experience may very well teach men how to realize that end. The sympathetic impulses, moreover, work in constantly expanding fields. This sympathy cannot be derived from egoism, a process which would be truly miraculous, but is original and underived, and contains in itself the whole of morality. This makes possible an explanation of self-sacrifice in the interests of others, and also shows that virtues are but the means which have been found to be productive of good results, which, however, we should dispense with if at any time they should cause injury. We should preserve only that which is conducive to the general happiness.

A. W. CRAWFORD.

HISTORICAL.

The Relation between Human Consciousness and its Ideal as Conceived by Kant and Fichte. ELLEN BLISS TALBOT. Kant Stud., pp. 286–310.

The *Kr. d. r. V.* distinguishes sharply between the formal and material aspects of consciousness. The matter, given from without, is wholly lacking in form, and the unifying activity of thought, even in its highest phase as transcendental apperception, is devoid of content. Although Kant might not say that the two elements could exist apart, he certainly regards their union as mechanical, rather than organic. In conceiving of human thought thus, he makes it different in kind from his ideal of cognition, *intellektuelle Anschauung*. His doctrine of *intellektuelle Anschauung* has two forms ; the lower seems to have been reached by starting with the material aspect of thought and forming a concept of a matter which contains its own principle of unity ; the higher, by starting with the 'I think' and conceiving of a self-consciousness which is its own content. The second conception is worthy to serve as the ideal of knowledge ; but Kant's doctrine is defective in that it regards this ideal as one to which we cannot even approximate. It is only a problematic concept, and our cognition, at least as far as we can ever know, is wholly different from it in kind. This difficulty is not overcome in the later Critiques. Kant seems, indeed, to admit the possibility of our approximating to the moral ideal, but this ideal is either the purely formal moral law, or an artificial union of happiness and virtue ; in either case it is lower than *intellektuelle Anschauung* And in the *Kr. d. U.*, both æsthetic judgment and the concept of design reveal the fatal defect of human consciousness : the æsthetic Idea cannot be cognition, because it lacks the adequate concept ; the concept of design is merely subjective. In distinction from Kant, Fichte makes it his fundamental presupposition that thought is essentially unitary. It must appear to itself dualistic, but the task of philosophy is to discover the unity behind this appearance. The difference between consciousness and its ideal is only one of degree. This means, not only that thought may gradually approximate to its infinite goal, but also that the ideal is immanent rather than transcendent. At his best, Fichte conceives this ideal as a perfect unity of form and matter ; but sometimes he seems to think of it as empty form. Those who criticise him for this apparently overlook the passages in which he rises to the higher view. Some have also misinterpreted his statement, that, if the goal were ever reached, consciousness would have disappeared. Consciousness, for Fichte, means dualism, and therefore must disappear ; but it is a mistake to suppose that the goal of the process is conceived as blank identity.

AUTHOR

The Psychology of Hobbes and its Sources. VIDA F. MOORE. Am. J. Ps., XI, 1, pp. 49–66.

The writer aims in this article to piece together Hobbes's system of psychology, and to show the connection of his doctrines with previous thought. The psychology of Hobbes deals with man's rational powers, which are either cognitive or conative. His attitude is non-metaphysical, his method empirical. The subjective nature of sense is clearly stated in four propositions. Under the term 'imagination' are included the phenomena of memory-images, of dreams, and of fancy, with a brief notice of after-images. As a logical consequence of his explanation of sensation, the sole form of association recognized by Hobbes is association by contiguity. Prudence is differentiated from reason ; the former is a forecast of the future and is based on experience, the latter a higher power, not born with us, but gained by industry. By reason, man is distinguished from the animals. From his discussion of pleasure and pain as subjective aspects of appetite and aversion, Hobbes proceeds to a purely mechanical and deterministic theory of volition. An examination of the psychology of Francis Bacon reveals the fact that he gives almost nothing by way of theory ; his thought is scarcely systematized. It is not so much psychology, as suggestion in regard to what psychology must be. His influence upon Hobbes is chiefly a matter of tendency and attitude rather than of direct transmission of doctrine. To Bacon, Hobbes owes his conception of psychology as a science, and the empirical method by which he proceeds. From Descartes, Hobbes got his notion of nature as a mechanical system, and the idea of the extension of the mechanical principle to physiology and psychology. He went further than Descartes in reducing all mental activity to modes of motion, and thus resolved the dualism of Descartes into materialism pure and simple. To the physical sciences of his day, especially, Hobbes owes the principle by which he explains every form of mental phenomena.

LENA M. ALDRICH.

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Man being an end to himself, he is endowed with a proper self-love that he may preserve and develop his own being. Aristotle carefully distinguishes the proper from the improper love of self. Only by the subjection of desire to reason does man acquire moral freedom. This freedom, however, is only to be found within society, and hence arises the duty of the state to complete the individual in mind and body. Saint Thomas develops this theory into the doctrine that the state should coöperate with the church—the more perfect society of the two—to realize the reign of God and to establish the moral order. But what is the happiness which man can realize only within society? In essence it is the activity of the reason continued throughout a life-time. Hence the value of the contemplative life. St. Thomas points out that happiness really results from a union with God through knowledge and love, since God is the object of happiness, the final end. It is religion which gives to man his highest perfection. In conclusion Kaufmann considers the present and future significance of the ethics and politics of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. He finds it to consist mainly in: (1) the founding of ethics and politics upon the reasonable nature of man—developed by Saint Thomas into the doctrine of a natural law, part of the eternal divine law; (2) the demonstration of the immutability of this law; (3) the doctrine that what corresponds to the reasonable nature of man is morally good; and (4) the establishment of the strict dependence of true morality upon religion.

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